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- Roberto Roccu - THE POLITICAL ECONOMY PROJECT.
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You can go to cart and save for later there. Average rating: 0 out of 5 stars, based on 0 reviews Write a review. R Roccu. Tell us if something is incorrect. Only 2 left! Add to Cart. Free delivery. Arrives by Wednesday, Oct 9. Pickup not available. About This Item We aim to show you accurate product information. Anticipating this dissolution, MB deputies were eager to pass laws securing their presence in the Constitutive Assembly that was to be formed.
They also focused on passing the Political Isolation Law, which banned officials who had served in top posts under Mubarak from running for election. Although the law was eventually suppressed when the chamber was dissolved, a related article was later included in the Constitution that Morsi introduced in late It also sparked anger among former NDP notables who considered the Political Isolation Law a potential threat, while many expected the MB to be as cooperative as it had showed itself to be towards the military and high-ranking businessmen of the Mubarak era.
Former NDP notables worried especially about local councils—which used to be their sanctuaries—the elections for which were constantly postponed while parliament drafted a new law with which to govern them.
Roberto Roccu | King's College London - guiblacbelpa.tk
Many believed this to be a sign of MB manipulation, an effort to assert complete hegemony, and began mobilising against the Brotherhood Hamdy and Vannetzel, Hence, the blurred local environment of overlapping networks and identities unravelled and gave way to sharpening cleavages. A dramatic shift in the local landscape added to this growing polarisation: while the NDP disappeared as a structured organisation, conversely, the Muslim Brothers suddenly appeared more prominently in the public sphere leaving their clandestinity behind.
At this time, many people suddenly discovered who in their entourage was a member of the MB. And then suddenly they came to the surface. My neighbour, my relative… We discovered that they were Brothers. Among them, two contributed to undermining the legitimacy both of the politics of goodness and of the Muslim Brotherhood. More precisely, though these protests are not a mere consequence of a so-called lack of development, they are moments in which the politics of goodness is variously questioned, criticised, and reinterpreted, and—at least partially—rejected.
Protests shed a crude light on the contradiction between the developmentalism myth and the deregulation of social protection, and have made that contradiction, in Egypt as elsewhere Catusse et al. The last decade, indeed, has seen the conjunction of endless protests, the wide scale privatisation of public companies, a rapid rise in the precariousness of labour even in what remains of the public sector Makram-Ebeid, , and the vertiginous rise of food prices due to the international financial crisis that began in for which abovementioned state subsidies were not enough to compensate.
Meanwhile, the vocal, neo-liberal wing of the NDP, gathered around Gamal Mubarak whose longing to become president has caused much resentment Hassabo, and has given a new face to the regime; a face that clearly fails to fit the image of the protective state, and thus has unmasked the aforementioned paradox. In Egypt, social aspirations of security and welfare have focused on the two major symbols of historical Egyptian state developmentalism—that is to say, the army and the president.
While the image of the president as za'im and saviour of the nation was being revived by those expectations of state protection, Mohamed Morsi was cast in this role and did not manage to fit in it. Beyond his lack of charisma, the absence of an economic programme, or the neo-liberal agenda, all of which have been commented on and denounced at length, I argue that this is also because khayr , of which the MB was the local champion, just did not meet the renewed demand for genuine state intervention.
The common vision of a conflict of development in which Islamists would oppose regime incumbents, and would be relegated to a separate field of religious philanthropy, has been deconstructed.
The biggest contradictory tension was to be found between the survival of the imaginary of state developmentalism and the effectiveness of neo-liberalisation. In the space created by this tension, the politics of goodness was deployed, involving actors from the former regime and the MB alike. Behind the consensus around khayr as an illusive avatar of state developmentalism in neo-liberal times, those actors struggled to secure positions of power on both political and moral grounds.
What we are now witnessing is the crumbling of this consensus. Not only have the former micro-networks of khayr been dismantled with the reshaping of local political elites in , inexperienced supporters of al-Sisi supplanted former NDP members in parliament; and the MB has, so far, not been granted any margin of tolerance ; but the local and national dynamics of the politics of goodness—that is to say, the relocation of welfare in the spirit of services and the survival of the developmentalist myth—have broken down.
In emic and academic discourses alike, open conflict has widely been seen as a hindrance to stability, and stability has consensually been linked to development. Once elected, members of the MB were soon decried as the spanner in those wheels.
While the struggle against incumbents to occupy positions of power intensified, they were accused of, and seen as, hurting the state itself, and consequently seen as breaking the motor of development from within. However, two years after Marshal al-Sisi's election as president, it is clear that the new regime has advanced neo-liberalisation further by cutting energy subsidies and has relocated the economy , rather than development, into the military, rather than into the public, sector.
Even the attempt to revive the glorious myth of state developmentalism with the pharaonic construction of the New Suez Canal, entirely overseen by the Egyptian armed forces, seems unable to cope with the asymmetries of accumulation and their conflictualisation. But what have you done for us, so far? Economic liberalisation begins; a multiparty system is allowed from onwards. Harsh repression targets the Muslim Brotherhood from on.source link
The Political Economy of the Egyptian Revolution : Mubarak, Economic Reforms and Failed Hegemony
Abdelrahman, M. Achcar, G. Adly, A. Allal, A. Atia, M. Al-Awadi, H. Bayart, J. Beinin, J. Camau and F. Vairel eds. Singerman ed. Bianchi, R. Bibars, I. Brooke, S. Camau, M. Geisser Le Syndrome autoritaire. Catusse, M. Picard ed. Destremau and E.
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